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Exceptions and Exception
Computerized Information
DIANE M. STRONG
Boston University
and
STEVEN M. MILLER
Fujitsu Network Transmission Systems
Handling in
Processes
Exceptions, situations that cannot be correctly processed by computer systems, occur frequently
in computer-based information processes. Five perspectives on exceptions provide insights into
why exceptions occur and how they might be eliminated or more efficiently handled. We
investigate these perspectives using an in-depth study of an operating information process that
has frequent exceptions. Our results support the use of a total quality management (TQM)
approach of eliminating exceptions for some exceptions, in particular, those caused by computer
systems that are poor matches to organizational processes. However, some exceptions are
explained better by a political system perspective of conflicting goals between subunits. For these
exceptions and several other types, designing an integrated human-computer process will
provide better performance than will eliminating exceptions and moving toward an entirely
automated process.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: 1.2.1 [Artificial Intelligence]: Applications and Expert
Systems—industrial automation; office aufomatzon; J. 1 [Computer Applications]: Administra-
tive Data Processing—business; K.4.3 [Computers and Society]: Organizational Impacts; K.6.2
[Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Installation Management—
performance and usage measurement t; K.6.4 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: System Management—quality assurance
General Terms: Design, Management, Performance
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Exceptions, exception handling, process design, Total
Quality Management (TQM)
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that computers are touted as labor saving and time saving,
exceptions occur frequently in computerized information processes [ Gasser
1986; Suchman 1983]. Exceptions are cases that cannot be correctly processed
This research was funded by the anonymous field site company.
Authors’ addresses: D. M. Strong, Boston University, School of Management, 704 Commonwealth
Avenue, Boston, MA 02215; email: dstrong@acs.bu. edu; S. M. Millerj Fujitsu Network Transmis-
sion Systems, 2801 Telecomm Parkway, Richardson, TX 75082,
Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are
not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM copyright notice and the title
of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the
Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and\or
specific permission.
01995 ACM 1046-8188/95/0400-0206 $03.50
ACM Transactions on Information Systems, Vol 13, No 2, April 1995, Pages 206-233,
Published in ACM Transactions on Information Systems
Volume 13 Issue 2, April 1995, Pages 206-233.
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
© ACM, 1995. This is the author's version of the work.
Exceptions and Exception Handllng . 207
by computer systems alone, and thus require manual interventions to pro-
duce outputs that meet organizational goals. These manual interventions re-
sult in reduced productivity and increased processing time. Furthermore the
exception-handling process itself can introduce new errors and thereby re-
duce the quality of process outiputs [Kling and Iacono 1984a]. Because of
these adverse performance effects, managers attempt to eliminate exceptions
by improving the capabilities of computer systems. Vendors sell systems
based on this same reasoning. However, in spite of these efforts, exceptions
are common in computerized information processes. For example:
Staff in one company routinely corrected inventory information before
using it because the computer-based data was not accurate enough for
decision making [Kling and Iacono 1984b].
Engineers at another company learned to enter “incorrect” parameters so
they could get correct results from a computer system [Gasser 1986].
Order processors at our field site routinely corrected inappropriate plant
assignments generated by a computer system before the system for-
warded the information to that plant.
In this article, we investigate the causes of exceptions in computer-based
information processes and the usefulness of routine procedures for handling
these exceptions. We focus on routine, operational-level information pro-
cesses, e.g., accounts receivable and payable, inventory control, order fulfill-
ment. These processes are typically highly computerized, and yet they still
require significant human resources to accomplish their goal adequately.
We start from five alternative perspectives on exceptions that provide a
basis for considering whether and how exceptions can be eliminated. One
perspective views exceptions as infrequent, nonrepetitive events about which
little can be forecast. Two perspectives are variations on the theme that
exceptions in information processes are “bad”; they are signals of poor
process quality that can and should be eliminated to improve performance.
The other two focus on the persistence of frequent exceptions ranging from
understanding why exceptions are difficult or impossible to eliminate to why
exceptions are a useful and important part of process capabilities.
We investigate these perspectives in light of empirical data from a
computer-based information process supporting order fulfillment in a large
organization. Our findings indicate that performance improvement depends
on distinguishing between exceptions that can and should be eliminated and
exceptions that are key to effective and flexible information processes. Under-
standing the causes of exceptions provides the basis for (1) reducing or
eliminating some exception types and (2) more astutely handling exception
types that are important to achieving process goals.
2. PERSPECTIVES ON EXCEPTIONS
For routine organizational processes, computer systems serve to structure,
rationalize, and routinize work [Markus 1983]. The measure of performance
of these computer-based information processes has traditionally been opera-
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tion without manual intervention [Bainbridge 1987]. That is, if we captured
correctly an information process within a computer system, the computer
system would repeatedly and correctly perform that process. The computer
system was either operating correctly, or it had errors requiring manual
intervention. These errors could be operation errors or process design errors,
but they were all errors that represented less than perfect performance of the
computer-based process [Kling 1980].
However, from years of experience with real computer-based systems in
real organizations, we know that this binary view of the world as correct or in
error is too narrow [Kling 1980]. Manual interventions in routine computer-
based processes occur frequently [Gasser 1986; Rasmussen et al. 1987; Sirbu
et al. 1984; Suchman 1983], and these interventions are not necessarily
caused by errors [Gasser 1986]. We take a broader view in this article and
consider the purposes of manual interventions in computer-based processes,
which we call exception handling, and their contribution to the performance
of the entire information process.
We define exceptions in computer-based information processes as cases
that computer systems cannot process correctly without manual intervention,
a definition broader than “errors.” This definition of exceptions covers those
generated by incomplete and erroneous information in inputs and outputs,
requests to deviate from standard procedures, and situations that computer-
based systems were never designed to handle, It is consistent with a dictio-
nary definition of “exception” as “a case to which a rule does not apply”l in
the sense that, by employing a thorough systems analysis of a routine
information process, all applicable rules are embedded in computer systems.
That is, the decisions made in routine processes are commonly assumed to be
programmable and suitable for computer-based systems [March and Simon
1958]. Cases computer systems do not process correctly are exceptions to the
decision rules in these systems. This definition excludes manual processing
that is not an intervention to cover cases that computer system rules do not
cover; that is, activities such as routine record keeping, paper movement,
printing and distributing reports, gathering input information, workload
planning, and training are not considered to be exceptions.
We take this broad view of exceptions because the presence of manual
interventions in computer-based systems has been always viewed as less
than perfect performance. Manual interventions, necessarily, have implica-
tions for process performance and thus for organizational performance. How-
ever, because exceptions are not necessarily errors, the answer to less than
perfect performance is not necessarily to eliminate exceptions.
In the real world, people understand that computer systems are not always
“correct”; there are exceptions requiring manual intervention. Computer-
based systems are typically surrounded by manual exception-handling proce-
dures, many of which are routine procedures developed as responses to
routine exceptions. For example, Gasser [1986, p. 212] discusses common
~Websters’ Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.
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situations in which “computing is misfit to the work it is intended to support”
and describes three strategies for accommodating computing misfit-fitting,
augmenting, working around—that are often critical to obtaining satisfactory
performance using computer systems. Computer system performance cannot
be evaluated without considering the performance of these surrounding
exception-handling routines. However, people have not paid much theoretical,
analytic, or managerial attention to these procedures. As a result, exception-
handling procedures and computer system work-arounds were never explic-
itly designed and were often more inefficient than necessary.
In the above discussion, there are two conflicting, yet widely held, views of
the nature of (what we are calling) exceptions in routine computer-based
processes. One view is that exceptions are a normal part of organizational
processes. Few organizational researchers or practicing managers would
argue that all routine operational decisions are programmable. By their
nature, organizational processes, even highly routinized ones, involve some
decision making, problem solving, and information processing requiring capa-
bilities and judgment of people [Suchman 1983].
Although few would argue against the view of exceptions as natural to
organizational processes, much current research and organizational practice
assumes an alternative view that routine decisions and processes are pro-
grammable and should be embedded in computer systems for efficient opera-
tion of processes. This view has a long research tradition. It is evident in the
research of Simon and associates (e.g., March and Simon [1958] and Simon
[1977]) and continues with expert system researchers, (e.g., Goldstein and
Storey [1991], Lenat et al. [1990], and Storey and Goldstein [1993]) who are
working to add judgment, common sense, and other human abilities to
computer systems. Expert system researchers often view systems as inade-
quate until they are capable of replacing human decision makers (e.g.,
Goldstein and Storey [ 1991] and Storey and Goldstein [1993]) although other
researchers are working toward design support systems that explicitly incor-
porate human decision makers (e.g., Cohen and May [1992] and Cohen and
Strong [1991]). Computing resources in general and expert systems in partic-
ular are viewed as increasing the information-processing capabilities of firms
[Galbraith 1973; 1977; Sviokla 1990].
This automated-systems view is further supported by current management
practices of process reengineering, which seeks to rationalize and computer-
ize information processes [Davenport 1993; Hammer 1990], and total quality
management, which seeks to find and eliminate sources of variation in
organizational processes [Deming 1986; Juran 1989]. The focus of these
research and management efforts is performance improvement by eliminat-
ing exceptions, rather than improving the performance of routines for han-
dling exceptions.
TCI explore further these two general views of exceptions and what should
be done about exceptions in routine organizational processes, we present five
perspectives on exceptions, which are shown in Figure 1. One perspective
views exceptions as infrequent random events (row 1 in Figure 1). Two
perspectives focus on exceptions as errors to be eliminated (errors at-
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Underlying
Assumption
Exceptions are
unpredictable.
Exceptions are
errors, indicators
of process
problems.
Exceptions are
“normal,” part of
process flexibility.
Perspectives on Perspectives on
Causes of Solutions to Solution
Exceptions Exceptions Approach
1. Random Event None None
2. Errors (from \ 4. Total Quality Eliminate
operations, Management causes of
design, and (TQM) exceptions.
dynamic
organizations)
3. Political 5. Human-Computer Efficiently
System System detect and
handle
exceptions.
Fig. 1. Perspectives on exceptions.
tributable to various process problems and total quality management); these
are the typical perspectives adopted by managers and information systems
researchers (see row 2 in Figure 1). Our interest in this article is to contrast
this view with the view in the third row of Figure 1, exceptions as a normal
part of organizational processes. The two perspectives in row 3 in Figure 1
(political system and human-computer system) seek to understand why ex-
ceptions persist in spite of attempts to eliminate them and consider how
exception-handling procedures could be more efficiently performed as part of
normal process operations. We discuss first the three perspectives on the
causes of exceptions (random event, error, and political system) followed by
the two perspectives on solutions to exceptions, i.e., eliminating them (total
quality management) or more efficiently handling those that persist (human-
computer system).
2.1 Random-Event Perspective
The word “exception” connotes typically rare and infrequent events. The
random-event perspective captures this connotation of exceptions. According
to this perspective, exceptions are low-probability events that are unexpected,
nonrepetitive, and infrequent. They include both random errors during nor-
mal processing and such events as fires, floods, and computer system down-
time that could disrupt processing.
This perspective is commonly assumed by managers and researchers;
people assume that computer systems will work correctly most of the time
and that exceptions will occur only rarely. However, a random-event perspec-
tive is not supported by research studies. Exceptions occur frequently in
information processes [Gasser 1986; Sasso et al. 1987; Sirbu et al. 1984;
ACM Transactions on Information Systems,Vol. 13, No 2, Apr,l 1995,
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Suchman 1983]. Some occur so frequently that theresponse to them becomes
routinized [ Gasser 1986; Sirbu et al. 1984]. The frequency of exceptions is a
major difficulty in systematically analyzing office operations [ Sasso et al.
1987].
The random-event perspective is included for completeness. Truly random
events cannot be eliminated, nor can efficient routine procedures be devel-
oped to handle them. Thus, they will not be discussed further.
2.2 Error Perspective
Exceptions may be caused by errors—operation errors, process design errors,
or errors due to dynamic organizations. Mistakes made by people are gener-
ally thought of as operations errors, whereas mistakes made by physical
systems such as computer systems are typically thought of as design errors
[Rasmussen et al. 1987]. That is, people can make mistakes, but computer
systems perform as they were designed to perform; so their “mistakes” are
classified as design errors or as random events, e.g., downtime.
Operation Errors. Operation errors include mistakes in processing (e.g.,
promising delivery when there is no inventory) and mistakes in inputs to the
process (e.g., orders for nonexistent products). In highly computerized pro-
cesses, operations errors in the form of mistakes made by people are rare
because people are not doing the processing. Operations errors can be com-
mon in manual interventions because exception handling may introduce new
errors into the process.
Design Errors. Managers and researchers may interpret the presence of
exceptions as evidence of poor process design; that is, if the information
process, especially the computer systems, had been designed and imple-
mented correctly, then there would be only random-event exceptions. Re-
search on the difficulty of understanding organizational processes provides
some support for this interpretation of exceptions [Anderson 1980; Cohen and
Bacdayan 1994; Ericsson and Simon 1984; March and Simon 1958; Nisbett
and Wilson 1977; Stinchcombe 1!390; Whitten et al. 1989]. Even if an accurate
representation of an existing process is available, (1) the process of design is
generally complex and not well understood [Simon 1981], (2) the knowledge-
able design of organizational routines and information processes is especially
difficult [Cohen and Bacdayan 1994; Galbraith 1973; 1977], and (3) the result
of applying information technology in organizations is not predictable [Markus
and Robey 1988]. In addition, many operational processes were not explicitly
designed but were gradually grown [Hammer 1990].
Dynamic Organizations. Exceptions caused by organizational changes are
a variation on design errors. Organizational procedures and goals, even for
routine processes, evolve over time [Nelson and Winter 1982]. A static process
captured by systems analysis and embedded in computers will not accurately
represent an organization for long. Over time, the mismatch between the
routines embedded in computer systems and organizational decision rules
may gradually increase, resulting in more exceptions. These exceptions repre-
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sent cases that computer systems were never designed to process because
these cases did not exist when the computer systems were developed.
If computer systems are not kept up to date with organizational decision
rules, people will gradually develop routines for recognizing and handling the
new cases that computer systems cannot process correctly. This gradual
development of exception detection and handling is consistent with an ob-
served characteristic of organizational routines as gradual learning by multi-
ple actors over time [Cohen and Bacdayan 1994]. Exception-handling work is
likely to increase over time as the mismatch between the computerized
system and the organization gradually increases.
2.3 Political System Perspective
A political system perspective (e.g., Kling and Iacono [1984a] and Markus
[1983]) explains the persistence of some exceptions, especially in information
processes that cross organizational boundaries, e.g., order fulfillment starts
in sales and continues into manufacturing. Different subunits, such as sales
and manufacturing, are likely to have different and possibly conflicting goals,
which may be captured in computer systems to varying degrees. For example,
the unit with the most political power may be able to implement its solution
[Kling and Iacono 1984a]. In general, computer systems developed in the
context of conflicting goals are unlikely to have met the goals of all subunits
[Franz and Robey 1984; Kling 1980].
Goal conflict is likely to result in exceptions. That is, the goals of less
powerful subunits still exist and may need to be addressed even if these
subunits failed to achieve their goals at the time of computer systems
development. Exception handling then serves the role of meeting, to some
degree, the needs of these less powerful subunits. Conflicting subunit goals
make it difficult to eliminate these exceptions since there may not be a
solution that is satisfactory, let alone optimal, for all units involved.
2.4 Total Quality Management (TQM) Perspective
A Total Quality Management (TQM) perspective is a “solution” perspective
rather than a “causes” perspective; it focuses on what to do about exceptions
rather than positing an underlying cause for exceptions. A TQM perspective
assumes that exceptions are systematic errors that should be eliminated.
These errors are eliminated by (1) finding the root causes of the most
frequent or costly exceptions and then (2) eliminating these root causes [Case
1987; Deming 1986; Fiegenbaum 1991; Ishikawa 1985; Juran 1989]. The
repeated application of these steps is the continuous-improvement aspect of
TQM. Continuous improvement differs from process redesign, which attempts
more radical improvements [Davenport 1993].
As a result of a TQM approach, work is done correctly the first time rather
than by inspecting and reworking to achieve quality [Case 1987; Deming
1986; Fiegenbaum 1991; Ishikawa 1985; Juran 1989]. The goal of a TQM
approach is process performance in which the only problems are truly ran-
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dom events or errors. All syste~atic errors have been identified and elimi-
nated.
2.5 Human-Computer System Perspective
A human-computer system perspective focuses on the employment of people
and computer systems to form an integrated human-computer process. Like a
TQM perspective, a human-computer system perspective is a “solution”
perspective. According to this perspective, both people and computer systems
add value to the process [Simon 1977; Strong 1989]. Computer systems store
and process information and report on problems. People monitor the opera-
tion of the process and provide process flexibility that is difficult to achieve
with computer systems.
In this perspective, exceptions are legitimate special cases. The goal is not
to computerize the entire process, but to employ both human and computer
resources appropriately. Exceptions that are a key part of the flexible opera-
tion of the process should be efficiently handled rather than eliminated. In
this perspective, inefficiencies occur when the tasks of people are not ade-
quately integrated with, and supported by, computer systems and vice versa.
One aspect of this perspective is to evaluate the costs and benefits of using
computer systems or people to perform tasks within routine processes. For
example, it may not be cost effective to capture all possible cases in computer
systems. Economic choices are made between using people or computer
systems for handling work based on the frequency of exceptions, the difficulty
of capturing and maintaining computerized versions, and the difficulty of
handling them manually. Thus, exceptions represent sensible economic deci-
sions rather than signals of process problems.
3. METHOD
Our research goal was to develop understanding about exceptions and derive
managerial recommendations for treating exceptions. To accomplish this
goal, we investigated the applicability of the alternative perspectives on
exceptions using an in-depth study of an operating information process in one
organization. Although a single-site study necessarily limited the generaliz-
ability of our findings, the level of detail available in such a study provided
evidence for the perspectives and examples to illustrate their applicability
[Benbasat et al. 1987].
3.1 Field Site
The field site was a Fortune 100 firmz that manufactures large, expensive
electronics systems that were sold to other firms for use in information-
processing applications. It was an international firm with sales and manufac-
turing facilities in many countries. The firm had a general reputation for
engineering excellence. Since the lifetime of its products was short, it was
continually designing, manufacturing, and selling new products.
2The firm has requested anonymity.
ACM TransactIons on Information Systems, Vol. 13, No. 2, Aprd 1995.
214 . D. M. Strong and S. M. Miller
We studied the information process that supported order fulfillment for
build-to-order manufacturing in the United States. This process was the
responsibility of the manufacturing organization and served as one of manu-
facturing’s primary interfaces with the sales organization. It was organized
by product groups and was physically located in the same, or nearby, build-
ings as associated product manufacturing.
Although some characteristics of this process are unique to this firm, order
fulfillment is a common process in manufacturing and service organizations.
Since order processing provides manufacturing with information needed for
production, its successful operation is critical to the financial well-being of
manufacturing organizations. One reorganization of order processing at our
field site led to orders not being processed and a significant decline in
revenue. Other firms have had similar experiences. Thus, our field site is
deliberately and carefully improving the quality of the information from its
process and the efficiency of the process.
3.2 Sources of Data
The object of our study is a process rather than people or organizational
units. To develop a detailed understanding of this process, we used expert
sources (i.e., key informants) rather than a representative sample of people
involved in the process. The informants included one manager, one supervi-
sor, two staff specialists who had previously studied the process, and two
expert order processors.
Archival records about the operation of the process, including two previous
studies and three reports, were available. The previous studies documented
the work and exceptions in this process. The three reports included the
following data: summary of processing times for approximately 1,000 orders
processed by three order processors during a six-month period, the exceptions
found in these orders, and processing details for key activities within the
process.
3.3 Data Collection
Collecting data about an operating process is a discovery process necessitat-
ing an iterative collection procedure. The two previous studies served as a
starting point for understanding the process; however we recollected all these
data by interviews and work observation. Informants were interviewed sev-
eral times until their explanations were sufficiently detailed and verified.
Expert order processors demonstrated the process by doing walk-throughs of
the process with sample orders of differing complexity. We also observed the
process for eight working days. During this observation, we recorded the
activities performed, the orders worked on, and the information inputs and
outputs.
3.4 Analysis
The interview data were analyzed and summarized in the form of process
flow diagrams. These diagrams were iteratively developed, refined, and veri-
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fied with process experts. From the interview data, we compiled a list of the
major decisions made during order processing, what information was needed
to make the decisions, and how this information was acquired and used. The
decision-making data were verified using follow-on interviews, the order
walk-through data, and the work observation data.
The analysis of the work observation data used the global modeling method
from protocol analysis [Todd and Benbasat 1987], which involves coding and
then flowcharting. The data were first transformed from the view of order
processors performing their daily activities to the view of orders flowing
through a process by coding3 the 602 observed activities. The coded work
observation data were than summarized in the form of a flow diagram that
was compared to the flow diagram from the interview data.
The interview data, work observation data, and archival records were
analyzed to determine the major exceptions occurring during the process,
where major exceptions were defined to be exceptions that occurred in more
than 15% of the orders or that took more than five minutes to handle per
order. Our goal was to determine the exceptions for which routinized detec-
tion and handling procedures were likely. We also checked that the major
exceptions caused nontrivial manufacturing or customer disruptions if they
were not caught and fixed.
For each major exception, the procedures for detecting and handling that
exception were compiled from the interview and work observation data. Each
detection procedure was described as a decision about whether or not 4 an
exception exists. Each exception-handling procedure was described in terms
of any decisions made followed by the actions taken. For each decision made
during exception detection and handling, the following are listed:
(1) the decision made,
(2) the information required to make the decision,
(3) the source of this information,
(4) the method of acquiring the information from its source,
(5) how the information was used to make the decision, and
(6) for exception-handling procedures, the actions taken.
This structure captures the decision-making and information-processing na-
ture of exception detection and handling routines and provides some indica-
tion of the skills, knowledge, and discretion used when making these deci-
sions.
3Coding was done in four passes: the first pass classified activities as part of the process being
studied or other; the second pass classified activities into major processing groups; the third pass
classified activities within the groups; and the fourth pass cross-referenced activities for the
same orders. All activities were coded by the first author. A sample of activities was coded by an
independent coder yielding %~o agreement for the first pass and TSYO agreement for the second
Qass.
4Although the existence of an exception may form a continuum, the purpose of detection is to
decide whether the information is good enough, i.e., a satisticing criterion [Simon 1981], or the
information should be further processed by exception-handling activities.
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Inefficiencies were found by comparing the procedures for steps that were
easy to perform in some procedures, but difficult to perform in others. The
focus of this analysis was on the availability of needed information, computer
system support, and the knowledge, experience, and expertise required of
order processors.
4. FINDINGS
4.1 Overview of Order Processing
The firm processed approximately 100,000 orders each year, each containing
approximately 250 pieces of information. Inputs to the information process
were customer orders collected by the sales organization. Outputs were
customer orders with all the information needed by manufacturing to build
the product. The major tasks in the process were: adding information needed
by manufacturing, including schedule date, engineering specifications, and
build sites (called sources). This was primarily a computerized process, i.e.,
computer systems produced this additional information. The process was
intended to work semiautomatically with only limited intervention from
people. However, significant human resources were required during the
process. Figure 2 shows this process. At the process starting point, (1) the
order has been entered into a computer system, (2) basic order verification
has been completed (which means that the firm has accepted the order), and
(3) the Order has been transferred to the scheduling computer system. Ml
these actions were the responsibility of the sales organization.
Next, the computer system assigned sources (production plants) to each
line item in the order and assigned a scheduled ship date to the order.
Sourcing was done by a table lookup of each component ordered (each line
item was one type of component) to find the plant that produced that
component. The scheduled ship date was the last day of the month in which
all the schedulable (major) components could be produced according to a
previously developed master production schedule stored in the computer
system. The computer system then sent the order to order processors in
manufacturing.
One hundred employees, called order processors, checked for exceptions in
orders, performed exception handling, and, generally, ensured that orders
moved through the process in a timely fashion. Order processors were orga-
nized into groups by product type: large syst ems, medium-sized systems,
small systems, and special systems. Total processing time for orders within
this process ranged from one day to several weeks. Approximately 25% of the
long processing times were directly attributable to exception handling.
The basic process shown in Figure 2 has remained essentially the same for
at least a 10-year period. However, changes did occur in the organizational
decision rules and computer systems used for some steps. During this study,
one expert system that produced product configurations was part of the
process. A second expert system to make sourcing (build site) decisions was in
ACM Transactions on Information Systems,Vol. 13, No, 2, April 1995
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From Sales
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Exceptions and Excention Handling
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Fig. 2. Order fulfillment process flow.
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prototype form, and a third expert system for making scheduling decisions
was being developed. The configuration expert system replaced a manual
decision-making process. The other two expert systems were replacing or
augmenting two conventional computer systems. The sourcing and schedul-
ing computer systems were being upgraded because they no longer were good
matches to the organizational process.
4.2 Exceptions
Eight major types of exceptions, listed in Figure 3 with their frequency, occur
during this process. Five of these are caused by unacceptable information:
unacceptable administrative, technical, configuration, sourcing, and schedul-
ing information. The fh-st two refer to information contained in orders when
they arrive from sales. Administrative information consists of order informa-
tion needed to process the order other than the components ordered, e.g.,
address, credit, transportation information. Technical information is the
components ordered with their quantities. The last three are information
added to orders during this process. The remaning three major exceptions are
caused by changes to orders, priority orders, and problems in transferring
orders between computer systems.
Three of the eight major exceptions had relatively low frequency ( 1 or 2% of
orders); however, exceptions in only 1% of 100,000 orders still require signifi-
cant exception-handling resources. The other five ranged in frequency from
1070 to 10070 of orders. Thus, all orders require some form of manual
intervention.
4.3 Exception Handling
A walk-through of a medium-complexity order illustrates the roles of com-
puter systems and people in this process and the routine procedures for
detecting and handling the eight major exceptions. Figure 2 indicates where
these exceptions occur in the process.
The order first comes to the attention of the appropriate order processor via
a telephone call from the salesperson to ask for priority treatment of an order
that is on its way. (The standard procedure is that order processors find new
orders by checking the computer system for new orders for their product(s).
However, salespeople call commonly to say an order is coming and perhaps to
ask for priority treatment.) The order processor questions the salesperson
about the need for priority treatment and makes a judgment based on
customer, dollar volume of the order, and previous experience with this
salesperson. Although official company policy is that all customers are treated
equally and orders are processed on a first-come, first-serve basis, there is an
undocumented list of important customers that the order processor knows
from experience.
The order processor next accesses the computer system and prints, at his
local printer, a copy of the order. He records the order in his personal
tracking system, scans the header information for problems, and jots down
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Type of
Exception
1 Priority
Orders
Z Unacceptable
Administrative
Information
3 Unacceptable
Technical
Information
4 Unacceptable
Configuration
Information
5 Unacceptable
Sourcing
Information
6 Unacceptable
Scheduling
Information
7 Production
System
Transfer
Failure
8 Changes to
Orders
d
given priority?
Is the administrative 2%
information (address,
credit, etc.)
acceptable?
Is the technical 10 %
information (the I
components ordered) I
acceptable?
Is the configuration
information
acceptable?
Is each order line
item sourced to the
correct plant?
Which week in the
scheduled month
should be assigned
for production?
Was the order
successfully
transferred to the
production computer
1%
25-50%
100 %
system?
Have changes to an ?%
order been submitted?
Applicable
Perspective on
Exception Cause
Error (Design)
Political System
Error (Operations)
Political System
Error (Operations)
Political System
Error (Design)
Error (Dynamic Org.)
Error (Dynamic Org.)
Error (Dynamic Org.)
Error (Operations)
Error (Design)
Political System
Fig. 3. Exceptions in the order fulfillment process.
these problems (e.g., the order does not yet have credit approval, or the
ship-to-address is missing). He does not attempt to resolve these problems
because other people should be attending to them (e.g., the credit department
should be completing the credit check). Then, he takes the order, along with
any others that arrived in the last hour or so, to the technical edit depart-
ment, which will attach configuration information (diagrams) to the order.
On the computer system, the order has already been configured by an
expert system. The technical editor checks the computer system output for
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problems, finding one. The computer system indicates that one component
cannot be configured into the product. The technical editor makes an assess-
ment about whether this component is supposed to be an extra spare part (in
which case the order is acceptable), whether there is a mistake in specifying
the component, or whether the expert system was in error. To resolve the
problem the technical editor calls the order processor who may need to call
the salesperson who may need to contact the customer, all of which may
cause a significant processing delay. When the problem is corrected, the
computer system prints the configuration diagrams for the technical editor
who returns the order with the diagrams to the order processor.
Next, the order processor checks that the sources assigned earlier by the
computer system are compatible with the configuration diagrams. (Compo-
nents configured into the same cabinet must be produced at the same source,
but the sourcing system does not consider this constraint.) The order proces-
sor reads the configuration diagram to find components in the same cabinet
and then scans each line item of the order in the computer system. The order
processor manually overrides incorrect sources in the computer system.
The order processor next checks his microproduction schedule for the
month and selects a week within the month for which the order is scheduled.
He then assigns this date as the release date in the computer system. After a
release date is assigned, the computer system, in an overnight batch process,
transfers the order to the production computer system.
The next morning the order processor prints a list of the previous night’s
activities (or picks up a printed report) and checks whether the computer
system transfer was successful. If not, he investigates the cause, which is
usually either missing information in the BOM (bill of materials) on the
production system or an old version of the order already on the production
system, fixes the problem (probably by talking with the production computer
system personnel), and rereleases the order. The following morning this
checking procedure is repeated. When the transfer between computer sys-
tems is completed successfully, production and assembly of the ordered
components can begin.
At any time during this process or after production begins, the customer or
the salesperson may initiate a change to the order. This requires special
problem solving by the order processor to determine what processing, if any,
must be revised.
Overall, the exception-handling procedures in this process serve their
purpose. Most exceptions in this process are caught and fixed during the
process. Approximately 927. of orders complete the process with no excep-
tions remaining. Eight percent of orders have an uncaught exception at the
end of order processing. These exceptions are caught in manufacturing or at
the customer site. Considering that 100% of the orders had some form of
exception during the process, 92% is good performance. However, the un-
caught exceptions represent 8,000 orders—hardly a signal of excellent perfor-
mance. Most of these exceptions are caught in manufacturing, resulting in
some form of disruption or resource expenditure (e.g., when a plant assigned
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to produce a portion of the order is unable to produce that part, it must be
reassigned to a different plant). Exceptions caught at the customer site range
from products delivered later than promised to products that do not function
because they were incorrectly configured.
4.4 Efficiency of Exception-Handling Procedures
Our efficiency analysis found three general inefficiencies in exception-
handling procedures. These inefficiencies required the use of more resources
(usually the time of people) than other exception-handling procedures. More
exception-handling resources than usual were required when:
(1) detecting exceptions required 100% manual inspection,
(2) information needed for decisions was not readily available, and
(3) controls in computer systems were too restrictive.
Detecting Exceptions. 1005ZOinspection of orders to find exceptions was
needed when computerized support was not provided. For example, at the
time of our study, the sourcing computer system no longer produced correct
sources according to current company rules. Order processors had to scan
every line item of every order to check for incorrect sources. Although, in
practice, this was relatively fast because the order processors knew the types
of mistakes the system made, methods more efficient than 1009. inspection
could improve performance.
Difficulty in Acquiring Information. Acquiring the information to make
decisions about exceptions and their handling could be time consuming. For
example, priority treatment decisions required the use of undocumented
information acquired through experience. Novices acquired the needed infor-
mation by searching within the organization (e.g., they asked someone). In
general, novices spent more tinne searching for solutions to resolve complex
decision cases. As a result, experts processed 1.5 times as many orders as
novices in all time periods. Additionally, some order information must be
acquired from salespeople or customers after the order has been accepted for
production, which can cause significant delays in processing the order.
Controls in Computer Systems. Controls in computer systems increased
the difficulty of making routinely requested changes to orders. For example,
one computer system has controls to prohibit changes to orders after they
have been scheduled for production in the current month. Since orders are
frequently changed within this time frame, exception handling for change
requests is unreasonably difficult and time consuming. For example, com-
puter system controls require resubmitting some orders revised by sales as if
they were entirely new submissions, which resulted in possibly unnecessary
rework. Because the stated policy and the actual operating policy differ,
excessive exception-handling resources were consumed when the computer
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system was designed to implement the stated policy of not allowing changes
within 30 days of delivery.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1 Error Perspective
Operation Errors. Three of the major exceptions, administrative informa-
tion, technical information, and transfer to the production system, can be
partially understood as operations errors. For administrative and technical
information, operations errors can occur in gathering the information from
customers and in entering it into a computer system. Salespeople often lack
the knowledge to specify correctly the components needed in a complex
product; this results in incorrect technical information, However, many ad-
ministrative and technical information exceptions are explained better by the
political perspective. For transfer exceptions, erroneous information in the
production computer system (e.g., old bill of materials information) may cause
the production system to refuse to accept orders transferred to it. Transfer
exceptions may occur also when the communication link between the com-
puter systems fails (a rare, random event). Additionally, operations errors
occur as people perform exception-handling routines. For example, order
processors may fail to detect incorrect sources (production plants), or they
may correct an incorrect source with another incorrect source.
Design Errors. Design assumptions in computer systems contribute to
difficulties and inefficiencies in performing exception handling. For example,
computer systems were designed to implement the official policy of complete
orders, rather than the actual operating procedures of starting production on
incomplete orders. Computer system controls that made it difficult to change
orders after production started served only to complicate the process of
completing order information. A similar case occurs for priority orders. The
computer systems provided no support for priority orders because the system
design assumed a first-come, first-serve policy for order fulfillment. Although
these cases seem to be examples of design errors and are considered to be
design errors by at least some employees of the firm, a political system
perspective provides a better explanation for these exceptions than an error
perspective does.
Dynamic Organizations. The sourcing and scheduling information pro-
duced by computer systems is frequently incorrect. Although sourcing and
scheduling exceptions could be classified as operation or design errors, a
better explanation of the incorrect information is organizational changes.
These computer systems were not in error when they were first installed. For
sourcing information, as the company grew and facilities were both added
and consolidated, the decision rules for assigning order components to plants
also changed. Although the database of facilities and components was up-
dated to match the new environment, a major restructuring of the database
and programs was required to implement the current company decision rules.
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Until that restructuring and reprogramming could be performed, plant as-
signment decisions made by the computer system using historical informa-
tion and heuristics were incorrect. Similar circumstances applied to the
scheduling computer system and the scheduling information it produced.
Organizational changes apply to people working in the process in a some-
what different way than they apply to computer systems because the people
are performing exception handling. People will learn and develop routine
procedures for detecting and handling exceptions as needed [Cohen 1991;
Kling and Iacono 1984b]. For temporary or eliminated exceptions, execution
of these procedures may persist long after there is any need to check for the
presence of exceptions [Cohen and Bacdayan 1994]. For example, some
special checking of orders from one sales region was being done even after the
management in that sales region changed and the problems being checked for
no longer occurred.
5.2 Political System Perspective
According to a political system perspective, differing and conflicting subunit
goals can lead to exceptions that are difficult to eliminate. At our field site,
relationships among customers, sales, and manufacturing generate examples
of such exceptions.
Order processing in manufacturing regularly dealt with incorrect or incom-
plete administrative and technical information from sales. Although the sales
organization, according to company policy, submitted only correct and com-
plete orders to manufacturing, in practice, this policy was not enforced. Sales
had incentives to submit “soft” orders to meet volume and revenue targets.
These “soft” orders were for the correct product, but were missing details
about product options (technical information). Additionally, manufacturing
did not need all order information before starting production, e.g., the ship-
to-address (administrative information) was not needed until the product was
ready for shipment. In these cases, sales was supplying incomplete or inaccu-
rate administrative or technical information, not because of mistakes (oper-
ation error), but because they wanted to get orders into the production
pipeline.
Given sales incentives, manufacturing could not easily enforce a policy of
accepting only complete orders. If such a policy were enforced, erroneous or
inaccurate information would be supplied and then changed later. Manufac-
turing also had incentives to start production on incomplete orders if there
was no order backlog. Unfortunately, the computer systems were designed to
implement the official policy of complete orders (perhaps a design error),
rather than the actual operating procedures of starting production on incom-
plete orders.
Changes to order information, another major type of exception, were gener-
ated by customers and salespeople. Customers requested different products,
changed their desired delivery date, cancelled orders, etc. Although sales
contracts stated that customers could not change orders within 30 days of
promised delivery, this policy was unenforceable because customers could
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always refuse to accept delivery of products. Eliminating exceptions caused
by customers changing their orders required changing the behavior and
expectations of customers. Although this could be done, organizations may
prefer to respond to the requests of their customers by providing support for
changing orders. Salespeople may submit changes to previously submitted
“soft” orders, i.e., orders based on what they thought the customer wanted,
but had not actually agreed to yet.
Priority orders represented a class of exceptions that involved a request to
deviate from the standard process or procedure. Most of these requests were
attempts to reduce the expected lead time, e.g., requests from customers or
salespeople for priority treatment, continued processing without waiting for
credit checks, and faster methods of shipment. If filling an order takes
significant time, as is likely in a build-to-order process, inevitably there will
be requests for special treatment for some orders. Although company policy
was first-come, first-serve for orders, another policy, designed to limit sales
requests for special order treatment, specified that a maximum of 10% of all
orders could be priority orders.
The exceptions described above cannot be easily eliminated. In one sense,
management tried to eliminate them by stating official policies (e.g., no
changes to orders within 30 days of shipment) and then embedding these
policies into computer systems. However, this served only to generate more
exceptions and make exception handling more difficult and inefficient than
necessary.
Using the actual operating policy rather than the official policy is not
necessarily a feasible solution. Consider, for example, priority orders. The
management of the firm was reasonable in publicly stating a first-come,
first-serve order fulfillment policy and internally promoting equal treatment
of customers. Salespeople also were reasonable in attempting to get priority
treatment for their customers who wanted the product sooner than normal
lead time. They were also reasonable in their attempts to meet revenue goals.
Order processors recognized that it was in their interest and the firm’s
interest to be sure there were no problems with the orders of high-volume
customers and critical accounts. Although the order processors who accepted
priority orders worked in manufacturing, manufacturing also recognized the
value of smooth and efficient production without priorities and changes after
production started.
Management response to exceptions that fit within the political perspective
was varied. For example, priority orders were capped at 107o, which seemed
to be agreeable to both sales and manufacturing. A code was added to orders
to indicate that an order was a “soft” order so that sales could submit it, but
manufacturing knew that the information was not necessarily accurate.
5.3 Total Quality Management (TQM) Perspective
A TQM approach of eliminating exceptions appeals to managers because
exceptions require costly manual processing that results in reduced process
performance, e.g., longer processing times, greater resource requirements,
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and possibly lower output quality. The quality control literature, e.g., Fiegen-
baum [1991] and Ishikawa [1985], argues that it is cheaper to fix the process
than to fix continually the problems that occur. For computer systems that no
longer match organizational decision rules, the resources allocated to excep-
tion handling represent the cost of out-of-date computer systems which,
according to a TQM perspective, will be greater than the cost of updating the
computer systems.
At our field site, configuration, sourcing, and scheduling information excep-
tions were generated by computer systems that did not match company
policies. The firm was reworking the sourcing and scheduling systems and
continued to maintain and update the configuration systems. The firm in-
stalled a version of the configuration expert system in the sales organization
to help salespeople specify a technically correct product. The production
system was being improved to eliminate gradually any remaining errors in
transferring orders to it. Although our field site is updating its computer
systems, there is a significant lag in developing and implementing these
systems. This is not unusual; many firms have a large backlog of computer
system development and maintenance requests [Swanson and Beath 1989].
These were technical, computer system maintenance solutions. Although
they were relatively straightforward, they were neither simple nor inexpen-
sive to implement. Keeping computer systems current with organizational
policies and decision rules can be difficult. In the short term, it may be
necessary to work around or handle computer system exceptions manually to
accomplish work in a timely manner. These short-term solutions, however,
seem to become long-term solutions. If the feedback loop to computer system
maintainers is incomplete, maintainers may not get the information needed
to initiate updates. Additionally, the availability of short-term work-arounds
reduces the urgency of developing solutions.
Applying a TQM solution to political system exceptions is unlikely to solve
the problems. For example, management at the field site has stated that (1)
customers could not change orders, (2) sales could not submit incomplete
orders, and (3) order fulfillment was a first-come, first-serve process. How-
ever, implementing these policies in computer systems (which some might
believe would enforce the policies) has only made exception handling more
costly rather than reducing the need for it. For example, it took more order
processors and more processing time to make changes to orders when there
were strict controls over changes. More experienced order processors were
required to carry out the actual operating procedures for priority orders since
priority lists were not documented.
In sum, a TQM solution of eliminating exceptions is likely to work best for
exceptions generated by operation errors, design errors, or dynamic organiza-
tions. Some error exceptions can be eliminated by updating computer system
capabilities. However, even this solution must consider that, for some com-
plex and low-volume exceptions, people may be more efficient processors than
computer systems. A TQM solution may worsen process performance when
applied to exceptions generated by political systems because exceptions may
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not be eliminated, but exception handling becomes more difficult, inefficient,
and possibly error prone.
5.4 Human-Computer System Perspective
Although most of the process improvement efforts at our field site were
consistent with a TQM approach, there were some examples of solutions that
were consistent with the human-computer system perspective. For example,
the configuration expert system correctly processed 987o of the orders pre-
sented to it, but it also provided support to the technicians for the remaining
2’?lo of orders. The system “knew” when it could not generate a correct
configuration given the components ordered and supplied technicians moni-
toring the system with information about why it could not complete the
configuration. It then provided support for manual inputs to complete the
configuration or to change the ordered components so the system could
generate a configuration. The production computer system provided similar
information about orders it did not accept, although it provided less support
for changing orders to correct problems.
The firm was also providing more flexible reports and computer tools to
assist order processors in monitoring the progress of orders. Although one
goal of these efforts was to replace large nightly reports, this was a general
move in the direction of an integrated human-computer process with order
processors as process supervisors, rather than an automated process with
order processors as exception handlers.
One example of a TQM approach at our field site resulted in a somewhat
integrated human-computer system with cost-benefit aspects. The firm was
attempting to reduce sourcing exceptions greatly by installing expert systems
to catch and process the cases that the traditional system did not source
correctly. Two expert systems were developed, one for midrange products and
one for large products. The midrange expert system correctly processed
approximately 9890 of the orders presented to it, which met company policy of
requiring at least 95 YO coverage before a system could go into production.
This policy can be interpreted in light of a cost-benefit approach to mean that
100’%0 coverage (i.e., no sourcing exceptions) may not be economically or
technically feasible. In contrast to this policy, the large-products expert
system was implemented with only 80% coverage. Large products were
complex and low volume. The expert system handled the relatively routine
orders, i.e., higher volume and lower complexity. People then focused on the
most complex and low-volume (perhaps unique) orders that would be difficult
to capture and maintain in an expert system. Although management was
unhappy with 80% coverage, developers and order processors seem to have
implicitly performed a cost-benefit analysis concluding that the 20~0 remain-
ing exceptions were satisfactory.
The integrated human-computer system solution is best applied to those
exceptions that organizations choose not to eliminate or cannot eliminate
practically. One goal of this approach is to develop efficient methods for
handling these cases, either by providing more efficient manual procedures or
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by changing computer systems in a way that provides better support for the
flexible processing that people can provide for complex cases.
In our view, each of these perspectives on exceptions provides some insight
into the nature of exceptions in information processes. Focusing on any one is
unlikely to address adequately the needs for improved performance of infor-
mation processes. However, because some decisions are not programmable
and some tasks, even if programmable, can be more cost effectively performed
by people, a human-computer system perspective provides a useful, overall
view for improving process performance.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have noted an inconsistency in the focus of research efforts between
studies that clearly document the need for people in highly computerized
routine processes and the many research streams devoted to learning to
automate all human information processing. The current management zeal
(around TQM) to eliminate all but random variation in organizational pro-
cesses, especially routine processes, complements these computerization re-
search streams.
We are not arguing against pushing the frontiers of computer capability,
nor are we arguing against applying TQM approaches. There are clearly
organizations and organizational processes whose performance could be sig-
nificantly improved by applying TQM and process redesign techniques. How-
ever, to use continually advancing computing technologies in real organiza-
tions effectively, further research is needed in two general areas:
(U the role of people in highly computerized processes,
(2) the design of computer-based systems that work effectively in organiza-
tional processes with multiple conflicting goals.
6.1 Directions for Future Research
During our field research, two problems related to the role of people in highly
computerized processes became apparent. One was that people were expected
to do whatever computer systems could not do; however, this role was poorly
integrated with, and supported by, computer systems. This is an “irony of
automation” [Bainbridge 1987]: designers seek to eliminate people from
processes because they are unreliable and inefficient, yet they leave people to
perform all the tasks the designer could not automate. The result is “an
arbitrary collection of tasks, and little thought may have been given to
providing support for them” [Bainbridge 1987, p. 272].
The other problem was a longer-term concern about maintaining and
developing human expertise when computer systems processed most cases.
People processed the most complex cases that computer systems could not
process, but they did not have the opportunity to become experienced with
simpler cases because computer systems processed these cases more effi-
ciently. Additionally, employees needed typically to understand the decision
rules incorporated into computer systems. Especially with expert systems,
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problems exist with maintaining human expertise and becoming too depen-
dent on expertise built into computer systems [Strong 1989; Sviokla 1990], A
partial solution may be to use expert systems for training and distributing
expertise within the organization [Prietula and Simon 1989; Strong 1989].
The second general area for research, designing computer systems to
function in the context of political processes with competing and conflicting
goals, has been recognized as a critical research area for some time [Kling
1980; Markus 1983], but little progress has been made. In our view, a key
component of such computer systems is flexibility, especially the ability to
meet multiple and changing needs. Flexibility and the ability to change and
adapt are key to user satisfaction with information systems [Bailey and
Pearson 1983; Sterling 1974]. However, computer systems for operational-
level processes generally have the effect of structuring and routinizing these
processes [Markus 1984], even when advanced technologies such as expert
systems are employed [ Sviokla 1990]. At our field site, the flexibility needed
to address conflicting goals adequately was provided by people working
around the computerized process.
To support these two general research issues, some more specific research
areas need to be further addressed, including:
—Methods for gathering and analyzing data on organizational processes and
routines, i.e., how to take and analyze an organizational-level protocol.
—Computer support for exception detection and handling decisions (some
initial progress is reported in [Strong 1992]).
—Ways for maintaining information systems efficiently and effectively. Much
of the past research work on software maintenance has focused on the
technical aspects of the software to be maintained [Bendifallah and Scacchi
1987]. Research is needed on managing maintenance [Swanson and Beath
1989] and on the relationship between system maintenance and the work
process the system supports [Bendifallah and Scacchi 1987].
—Development of more flexible information systems.
Our research has only begun to touch on some of these research issues.
Much research is still needed before we can design integrated human-
computer processes that work well in dynamic organizations with multiple
conflicting goals. However, using the observations from this study, organiza-
tions can take steps toward better computer-based information processes.
6.2 Managerial Recommendations
Organizations need to decide, based on a thorough understanding of the
nature of exceptions in their processes, which exceptions should be elimi-
nated and which exceptions represent the ability of an information process to
handle a variety of requests. For problems to be eliminated, the root cause of
the problems should be studied and then eliminated (i.e., take a TQM
approach). For special cases, more efficient routines for detecting and han-
dling them can be designed, e.g., develop computerized routines to handle
them. The following five recommendations derived from our field study and
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our perspectives on exceptions provide more specific suggestions for manag-
ing exceptions in routine organizational processes.
Recommendation 6.2. L Design mechanisms for evolving computer systems
as the organization evolves. The dynamic nature of organizational processes
can result in computer systems gradually becoming mismatched to the
organizational processes they supported. Users may find it easier to accom-
modate their work to the system rather than to negotiate and work with
maintainers to fix the problems [Bendifallah and Scacchi 1987]. Additionally,
MIS managers view user requests for maintenance as one of their key
maintenance problems [Swanson and Beath 1989]. Better mechanisms for
evolving computer systems as the organization evolves will rely on better
communications and understanding among users, maintainers, and their
management [ Schneidewind 1987; Swanson and Beath 1989].
Recommendation 6.2.2. Beware of radical process redesigns. Attributing
exceptions to process design problems leads managers to initiate process
redesign projects, especially for processes that appear to be routine and well
understood. However, these same routine processes are the ones that are
critical for daily revenue generation and servicing of customers. Our field site
experienced significant revenue declines when their order fulfillment process
failed to move customer orders from sales into manufacturing after a major,
yet relatively straightforward, reorganization. TQM recommends continuous
improvement in small steps, which avoids some of the risk of process re-
designs. However, performance improvements are likely to be smaller
[Davenport and Short 1990], and process redesign experts argue that the
large performance improvements from redesigns are worth the risk [Daven-
port 1993; Hammer 1990]. Although the reorganization at our field site may
have been too large, a failure to appreciate the nature of exceptions explained
by a political perspective on the relationship between sales and manufactur-
ing in order fulfillment may have contributed to problems.
Recommendation 6.2.3. Design more efficient exception-handling routines.
The three inefficiencies we observed in exception-handling routines, detecting
exceptions by 100% inspection, unavailable information, and restrictive com-
puter controls, can be addressed. First, good exception detection methods
focus attention on exception instances, or at least on those cases that are
likely to have problems. One function of computer systems is to focus atten-
tion on problems and possible causes of problems [Simon 1973; 1977], e.g.,
with exception reports. People can also be focusing mechanisms; e.g., sales-
people indicated whether or not orders they submitted were “soft” orders.
Second, information needed for exception handling could be made available in
computer systems.
Third, restrictive controls should be evaluated to balance the need for
adequate controls against support needs for exception handling. Controls in
computer systems are generally good design practice, but they should match
the actual controls used in organizations. More flexible controls in computer
systems could provide a basis for resolving some exceptions best explained by
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the political system perspective. For example, sales and manufacturing could
negotiate a method, supported by computer systems, for easily tracking and
changing incomplete or tentative orders, that does not overly penalize the
performance of either group. If the computer system “knew” when each piece
of information in the order was needed, it could provide controls so that sales
could change information until the time manufacturing started taking actions
based on that information. Although existing exception-handling routines can
be made more efficient, a more global approach should be taken toward
improving information process performance as is described in the next two
recommendations.
Recommendation 6.2.4. Design for people and computer systems, not just
computer systems. l!Jhen computer systems are being developed for routine
processes, designers tend to focus on designing the computerized routines—a
natural focus for information systems analysts. A key aspect of designing
integrated human-computer systems is to understand and evaluate the role
of people in the process. The role of computer systems is generally clear; it is
to process large volumes of information quickly and accurately. The role of
people in high-volume transaction processes is less clear.
Designers need to design not only the computerized routines, but also
routines to be performed by people, and the interaction between the two.
Focusing on the interaction between computer systems and people is different
from designing a user interface, which focuses on the computerized side. The
interaction is important because it addresses the issues of adequate decision
support, computer controls, and support for novices as well as experts.
Recommendation 6.2.5. Design the entire process rather than focus on a
functional area. This recommendation further addresses exceptions at-
tributable to the nature of political systems. At our field site, the computer
systems provided better support for manufacturing’s view of an ideal process
rather than sales’ view. However, since sales used the systems to meet their
needs, manufacturing had to resolve more exceptions. Both groups would
have better performance if the design supported the order fulfillment process
rather than separately addressing the manufacturing and sales portions of
the process,
Employing a cross-functional process view with a focus on customers rather
than the usual functional “stovepipe” view of organizational work is a com-
mon TQM recommendation (e.g., Deming [1986]). However, this TQM recom-
mendation still does not addrem conflicting goals. For example, two conflict-
ing policies at our field site, (1) some orders had priorities and (2) order
fulfillment was first-come, first-serve, were policies designed to address
customer needs. Thus, we still do not have a good answer for designing a
process in the presence of conflicting goals.
6.3 Conclusion
Although our in-depth, single-site field study achieved our research goals,
data from a single site, necessarily, limits the generalizability of the results.
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Our recommendations are most likely to apply to processes similar to the one
we studied, i.e., operational-level, structured, computer-supported informa-
tion processes. Additionally, the methods we used to collect our field data are
traditional systems analysis methods that have limitations noted earlier that
may lead to inadequate process understanding, e.g., cognitive limits of expert
workers and process observers. Thus, our findings may be overly structured
and rationalized.
Both of the general areas discussed for future research, the role of people in
highly computerized processes and the design of computer-based systems
that work effectively in organizational processes with multiple conflicting
goals, are aspects of the design of organizational processes in conjunction
with the design of computer-based systems. Further research in these areas
is needed to provide the theoretical foundation for designing integrated
human-computer systems that work effectively in real organizational pro-
cesses.
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